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Abstract 
 
To estimate the effect of an increase in minimum wages on gender, this paper utilizes a 
natural experiment opportunity, arising from increases in 21 states of the U.S. and the 
District of Columbia in 2015. In my study, I implement a difference-in-differences (DID) 
methodology to evaluate the impact of the increase in minimum wages implemented in 
2015 on gender in the Production industry, the Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports and 
Media industry and the Transportation and Material Moving industry. Through my 
research, instead of focusing on the employment effects of minimum wages, I shed light 
on the effectiveness of minimum wages as a tool of redistribution of income for low wage 
earners. My results conclude that the greatest impact of an increase in minimum wages in 
2015 can be witnessed in the Production industry, where earnings of single women with 
one child increased by 9.60 percent and earnings of divorced women with no child 
increased by 9.65 percent. My findings report that the second largest impact of an increase 
in minimum wages in 2015 was observed in the Transportation and Material Moving 
industry, where earnings of divorced men with one child increased by 6.80 percent and 
earnings of married men with no child increased by 6.69 percent. The impact of an increase 
in minimum wages in 2015 had no impact on the earnings of workers in the Arts, Design, 
Entertainment, Sports and Media industry.  
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1    Introduction 
 
The minimum wage has long been a contentious issue in the American 
consciousness, raising questions about its fairness, its effectiveness and as a tool of 
redistribution to lower wage earners. I will examine the effect of an increase in minimum 
wages and whether that affects men and women differently in the U.S.? This topic is 
extremely prevalent in the real world as minimum wages have the largest impact on 
employment figures and determine an individual’s incentive to supply labor, which is equal 
to the number of participants in the labor force. Gender pay disparities vary across 
industries and as well as different job statuses within an occupation. These gender wage 
disparities originate not only from segregating women into certain industries and 
occupational levels, as a result depressing wages for workers in those industries but also 
arise from difference in work interruption between men and women.  
Blau and Kahn (2000) state that traditionally, economic analysis of the gender pay 
and segregation across occupations has focused on gender-specific factors which often 
shed light on gender differences in qualifications or labor market treatment of similarly 
qualified individuals. Mohr (2014) in her article elucidates that men apply for a job when 
they meet only 60% of the qualifications, but women apply only if they meet 100% of the 
requirements. Women are victim to this statistic, as they don’t feel confident until they’ve 
checked off every requirement on the list. Keaveny and Inderrieden (2000) state that job 
inputs as a determinant of fair pay have been considered primarily from an equity theory 
perspective. Equity theory is formulates the approach of comparing ratios of one’s 
outcomes and inputs to a relevant equivalent. They argue that gender differences in job 
inputs may explain part of the gender differences in pay expectations. Women may have 
lower job inputs and often believe they actually deserve less. A number of theoretical 
models have examined the impact of minimum wages on employment figures. Studies on 
minimum wages by Lester (1946) focused on the effect of the introduction of federal 
minimum wage in the U.S. and other researchers such as Card (1992), Katz and Krueger 
(1994) have utilized natural experiment frameworks to evaluate minimum wage variations 
across states in the U.S.  
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A policy implication of an increase in minimum wage that affects men and women 
differently would be that it used to elevate the general well-being of the society to further 
increasing inequity between males and females. These differences across gender in job 
inputs may explain the wage differences in pay expectations between men and women. The 
main issue is the difference between the wages women receive and wages men receive but 
otherwise comparable in terms of relevant characteristics. 
Through the course of this paper my aim is to examine the effect of an increase in 
minimum wages on gender in the U.S. in states that increased their minimum wages 
compared to states that did not alter their minimum wages in 2015 by exploiting the natural 
experiment opportunity. I will be implementing a difference-in-differences (DID) 
methodology to evaluate the impact of the increase in minimum wages implemented in 
2015 on gender in the Production industry, the Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports and 
Media industry and the Transportation and Material Moving industry. I hypothesis that an 
increase in minimum wages would affect men and women differently because gender 
segregation does play a crucial role in explaining why certain industries tend to be male 
dominated and in terms of explaining the inter-firm wage differentials. This differential 
impact of minimum wages on gender would exacerbate when there’s an increase in 
minimum wages and suddenly employers are choosing to reduce earnings of female 
workers than male workers as a result. However, given that workers possess homogenous 
skills and qualifications at different occupational levels in the three industries, I expect 
income of women to increase significantly. Assuming that women tend to have lower pay 
expectations and as a result receive lower wages. 
The paper contributes to the literature by analyzing the effects of an increase in 
minimum wages on gender. Instead of focusing on the employment effects of minimum 
wages, I examine the effectiveness of minimum wages as a tool of redistribution of income 
for low wage earners. As women tend to be at the lower end of the wage structure, 
minimum wages by asymmetrically increasing lower earning wages, could reduce the 
gender wage differential. Also, I inculcate demographic characteristics such as marital 
status and number of own children in the household to explain time periods of work 
disruption for men and women across the three industries I examine. My results do show 
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that the effects of an increase in minimum wages across the three industries vary between 
men and women.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the previous literature on 
minimum wages and factors that may explain occupational segregation by gender; Section 
3 discusses the data and variables used in my empirical analysis; Section 4 discusses the 
regression analysis and the expected signs for difference-in-differences estimators; Section 
5 discusses the robustness checks conducted; Section 6 discusses cross-sectional 
regressions and includes findings on the impact of an increase in minimum wages on 
gender across the three industries; Section 7 and 8 conclude, provide suggestions for future 
research and discuss policy implications of the implementation of minimum wages.  
 
2     Literature Review 
Khamis (2013) states that the difference-in-differences analysis before and after the 
change in minimum wages is estimated for in treatment and control groups. The study 
acknowledges the main issue in the process of determination of treatment and control 
groups as the control group provides information in the absence of the treatment. Almost 
all research till data has focused on incorporating higher wage earners to account for the 
control group for minimum wage earners consistent with Acemoglu and Pischke (2003)’s 
study. This could be a viable control group but we would have to assume that minimum 
wages do not influence wage structures for higher occupation levels and income brackets 
above the minimum wage threshold. In my study, I exploit the natural experiment design, 
where some states implemented an increase in minimum wages and other states that did 
not in 2015 similar to Lester (1946)’s study to examine the effect of the establishment of 
the federal minimum wage in the U.S. The natural experiment approach does have an 
advantage over commonly used methodologies since treatment and control groups are 
identified by the exogenous variation in minimum wages. Whether states implemented an 
increase in minimum wages or not will determine which states will be a part of the 
treatment and the control groups.  
Brülhart, Carrère and Trionfetti (2012) conduct a difference-in-differences 
estimation and their results conclude that trade liberalization after the fall of the Iron 
Curtain bolstered wages and total employment in Austrian border areas was three times 
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larger compared to the effect on wages. However, wages are found to have adjusted more 
quickly than employment figures, which is consistent with the view that wages react more 
quickly to market conditions when compared to employment figures. Though labor-market 
histories and wages at the individual level were incorporated in their dataset, there was no 
information on demographic characteristics of Austrian workers. It could be possible that 
the occupational mix of workers in one area differed from that of workers in another 
geographical setting. These regional variations would be revealed if occupational mix was 
controlled for and indicated disparities between wages of men and women.  
Leigh (2003) also conducts a quasi-experiment to evaluate the impact of a rise in 
minimum wages on employment arising from six increases in Western Australia during the 
period 1994 – 2001. Though he accounted for changes in employment-to-populations in 
treatment and control groups, he does not incorporate sufficient statistical controls in his 
regression analysis. He does not include any other controls such as occupation levels across 
industries or age of the workers. Also, Leigh does not include or control for employment 
trends before and after between the treatment and control groups. Employment trends 
would report whether or not there are similar divergence trends between the treatment and 
control groups. However, he does conduct a falsification test to test if any of the six time 
periods dominated his results. In my study, I will examine the impact of an increase in 
minimum wages and how that affects the income of men and women. An individual’s 
employment status can vary between full-time and part-time employment and necessarily 
does not provide information on how income is redistributed among lower wage earners. 
The majority of the existing literature focuses on the employment effects of minimum 
wages but does not explain the mechanism through which gender wage disparities at 
varying occupational levels can be reduced across industries. 
Pereira (2003) evaluates the employment effects of an increase in minimum wages 
for workers aged 18 and 19 in Portugal since the Portuguese minimum wage amendment 
was directly targeted at teenagers. It’s intriguing how she can examine the intended effect 
on teenagers’ employment rates and expand prevalent literature on employment effects of 
minimum wages that have been a source of controversy.  Stewart (2004)’s study examined 
employment shifts of those directly affected by an increase in minimum wages with those 
with higher earnings. However, it’s difficult to correctly identify which subgroup of ages 
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is the intended target of an increase in minimum wages. Therefore, I will include all 
subgroups of ages in my dataset and will be incorporating the age variable to capture the 
demographic characteristics of male and female workers. 
The main explanations in the variation in the gender wage gap in the U.S are 
elucidated by gender segregation across occupations with varying rents and returns and 
gender differences in human capital accumulated. Bergmann (1974)’s overcrowding model 
formulated that discriminatory exclusion of women from “male dominated” jobs would 
result in an excess supply of labor in “female dominated” occupations, further depressing 
wages in these occupation. However, the role of the gender of the employer might play a 
significant role assuming that an employer might choose to discriminate against a particular 
gender and not formulate rational employment decisions on the basis of an individual’s 
pre-market characteristics. Conventionally, in most occupations women tend to be an 
intended target of occupational segregation.   
Mincer and Polachek (1974) estimated the earnings functions with relation to wages 
to investments in schooling for measuring the impact of work experience on gender wage 
differentials. They try to capture the extent to which the gender wage gap is a consequence 
of discrimination by employers. They draw these comparisons by controlling for factors 
that reflect differences in human capital between men and women. Gender wage 
differentials that remain unexplained after controlling for varying proxies of experience 
and productivity in their model are interpreted as labor market discrimination. However, 
Bielby and Baron (1986) argue that human capital model does not account for occupational 
segregation on the basis of gender but it could explain why men and women end up working 
in different industries or in contrasting occupational titles in an organization. It could be 
argued that if there are worker characteristics that are unobserved my firms and if women 
tend to have a lower supply of such characteristics then the “unexplained” aspect of the 
model would overestimate the presence of discrimination.  
Blau and Kahn (2000) suggest that if certain job titles have barriers to entry then 
this would restrict women from entering certain occupations and this could underestimate 
the existence of discrimination. They also argue that women employed in certain fields and 
occupations require comparatively less accumulation of human capital and on-job training 
and as a result earn lower wages. In addition, Hashimoto (1982) elucidates that 
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opportunities for on-job training, which is offered to workers formally or informally are 
believed to be an important fringe benefit existent across most occupations. His findings 
on the employment effects of minimum ages report that lost employment often deprive 
unemployed workers of access to greater job inputs and training. He also states that even 
workers who manage to remain employed at wages near the minimum wage may 
experience a reduction in training as well. This would reduce access to labor market 
experience for women assuming that the majority of the workers at the receiving end of 
these negative employment impacts are women. It would be rational to argue that because 
women have acquired less human capital compared to male counterparts in rigorous 
industries, they as a result are more likely to receive fewer fringe benefits and lower wages.  
Varca (1983) argues that sex differences in job satisfaction revolve around 
organizational rewards and that these differences are moderated by occupational level. It 
appears that men employed at upper occupational levels and women employed at lower 
occupational levels are more satisfied with their job and pay satisfaction. This could be 
precisely why lower level women reported relatively high pay satisfaction while receiving 
the smallest salaries is unclear. Though women employed at lower occupational levels 
might have reported high pay satisfaction while receiving the smallest salaries but it could 
also be argued that providing higher fringe benefits could offset their lower wages. Leaving 
lower level women more satisfied with their low wage earnings.  
Black et al. (2004)’s findings conclude that well-educated college women in the 
U.S earn approximately thirty percent less than their non-Hispanic white male equivalents. 
Their methodology highly relies on the measures for the role of labor market experience 
and majors pursued by individuals in college. However, it could also be true that their 
analysis isn’t doing justice to individuals that are choosing to further invest in higher 
education. Not all college majors require time to be invested in labor market experiences 
and sometimes individuals who choose to pursue higher education instead are making a 
practical choice. Majors in fields such as health care, legal & criminal justice and academia 
do not require labor market experience but expertise and further specialization in these 
fields is a fundamental requirement. Their findings would be more convincing if a higher 
percentage of individuals that seek labor market experience tend to be men when compared 
to women across different occupations.  
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Though a major pursued in college can determine wage disparities across 
occupations, it could be argued that it isn’t a definite indicator of an industry or the type of 
job an individual will choose to work in that particular field of study or outside of it. The 
labor market experience, which is deemed important for recent college graduates but only 
involves rudimentary tasks at the entry level, isn’t a fair judgment of one’s capabilities and 
peak career trends and earnings. Their methodology of incorporating a data set that focuses 
only on college graduates is a rational choice because it can be argued that college 
graduates who are being accepted for entry-level positions on an average are earning wages 
close to the minimum wage. Considering that these individuals are recent college graduates 
and have not invested a significant amount of the time in acquiring the labor market 
experience, they would relatively earn lower wages. Gender wage disparities across 
occupations can be formulated on the basis of an individual’s field of study in college but 
it surely isn’t an ideal predictor. If discriminatory exclusion of men and women from 
certain occupations is evident, this could depress wages in occupations where equally 
qualified, productive and efficient workers are employed. Blau and Ferber (1991) also 
argue that because women intend to spend a substantial amount of time out of the labor 
market, they are willing to accept lower rewards for experience in return for lower 
depreciation rates during periods of work interruption.  
Alkary and Tower (2006) explain that differences between women and men have 
traditionally been attributed to the limited number of women in the higher earning levels 
of organizations. Women are often concentrated in lower occupational statuses because of 
limited initial hiring at the entry level and a lack of upward mobility within organizations. 
Concentration of women in lower-level positions often means segregation in lower-paying 
positions. As a result, gender typing tends to result in segregation of women in certain 
positions and fields. Upward mobility within organizations may combat gender 
segregation, resulting in the progress of women into upper-level and higher earnings 
position. However, Banerjee and Newman (1993) conclude many organizational and 
sociocultural factors deny women the benefits of upward mobility. They also argued that a 
greater proportion of women compared to men were handicapped while advancing their 
career and received lower wages than their male equivalents. 
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Tying into that Blau and Kahn (1992) analyze the paradoxical nature of the wage 
structure in the U.S. when compared to wage structure in other countries across the world. 
If educational attainment is the primary source of explaining the differential impact of 
wages on gender, then this raises the question that why are women in the U.S. that are 
highly educated when compared to women in other countries and still experience the 
largest inequality in wages? The U.S. has also had a longer and stronger commitment to 
antidiscrimination laws than most economically advanced nations, the U.S. has 
traditionally been among the countries with the largest gender gaps. The striking finding 
of their study is that the higher the level of inequality in the U.S works to increase the 
gender differential in the U.S relative to all the other countries in the same and fully 
accounts for the lower gender earnings ratio in the U.S. compared to the Scandinavian 
countries and Australia (the countries with the smallest gaps).   
Goldin and Katz (2007) argue that research using large representative data sets, 
such as the Current Population Survey (CPS) or data from IPUMS (U.S, Census data), 
shows that the human capital model explains very little of the observed wage differentials 
between men and women. They also state that large data sets such as the CPS and IPUMS 
typically lack sufficient detail on relevant human capital variables. These data sources 
typically have no data on years of work experience and have only rudimentary information 
on number of years of schooling. In the absence of adequate measures of premarket human 
capital characteristics, researchers can use industry and occupation indicators as proxies 
for market skills. Although, this approach complicates the interpretation of the gender wage 
gap if industry and occupation assignments are themselves the consequence of labor market 
discrimination. Pal and Waldfogel (2016) analyzed data from the Current Population Study 
(CPS) to examine the trends in family wage gaps, but they did not analyze differences 
across demographic characteristics across wage distributions. However, these large 
datasets offer the ability to control for demographic characteristics at the individual level 
that determine earnings.  
Several studies have adopted different regression models and made use of different 
datasets covering varying time periods. Although there is, considerable variability in 
inferences regarding gender wage gaps but there are also some generalizations that can be 
accepted. The gender wage differential in several studies often remains unexplained even 
 12 
after carefully conditioning on pre-labor market skill differences such as occupation and 
labor market experience—that could itself be a result of discrimination experienced while 
employed in the labor market. If one argues that occupational segregation is not a result of 
discrimination as a presumption, there is existing evidence on gender wage disparities. Pay 
disparities are often attributed to the segregation of women in certain “female-dominated” 
occupational levels and industries.  
Anderson et al. (2003) in their findings conclude that women pay a wage penalty 
for motherhood, whereas men on the other hand earn a wage premium for fatherhood. 
Motherhood leads to women undertaking more responsibilities for childcare, which leads 
to reduced time to be invested in the labor force. Kmec (2011)’s study examined the 
difference between mothers’ and childless women’s motivation to work and work effort 
because of the traditional responsibilities undertaken by women. However, she found no 
difference between mothers’ and childless women’s willingness to work, work intensity 
and effort. Contrastingly, Azmat and Ferrer (2017) found that the prevalence of children 
reduces women’s on job performance and mothers often can be looked upon as being less 
committed and competitive. This may lead to employers consciously or unintentionally 
discriminating against mothers and these perspectives of the employers may lead to biases 
in hiring and work compensation decisions. As a result, this may lead to reduced upper-
mobility and lower promotional outcomes for women. A substantial portion of the gender 
wage differential can be assigned to different effects of parenthood on the division of labor 
by gender. In my study, it is important to take demographic characteristics on the individual 
level into account to evaluate the variation in income that might lead to parenthood 
penalties and premiums for women and men due to an increase in minimum wages. 
Inequalities across women by comparing different marital statuses would better indicate 
women’s personal characteristics that may influence their occupational statuses.  
Budig and Hodges (2010) explored variation in the wages association with the 
“motherhood penalty” and their findings conclude that the penalty associated with 
motherhood is larger for women at the lower end of the wage structure. The presence or 
number of children estimates the measure of “motherhood penalty” in my model, which is 
a proxy for work disruption. This “motherhood penalty” at the bottom end of the wage 
distribution in my model would be interpreted in a way that if the impact of an increase in 
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minimum wages has the greatest influence on the income of married women, my results 
would indicate wage disparities among women as well. A major limitation of their study is 
that they cannot examine the intervening mechanisms or the simultaneous varying effects 
on men and women over a time period. Through my study, I fill this gap in the literature 
by examining the effect of an increase in minimum wages on men and women with 
different marital statuses and the number of their own children across three different 
industries.  
 
3     Analytical Framework 
 
To investigate the effect of this public policy of an increase in minimum wages I 
obtained my dataset from IPUMS-CPS, which consolidates data from the Current 
Population Survey (CPS). The CPS is a monthly U.S. household survey that is conducted 
by the U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The dataset I acquired from 
IPUMS-CPS is microdata that provides specific information about individuals and 
households. This dataset is not constant across time, as same individuals and households 
in all the 50 states in the U.S. were not surveyed over a period of time. To examine the 
impact of an increase in minimum wages across time it would be advantageous to survey 
the same households but that’s an aspect of my dataset that I cannot control for. On the 
other hand, this could also work in favor of avoiding any selection bias inculcated in my 
data set by cherry picking individuals or households to be surveyed in a given state. Since 
I want to examine the effect on an increase in minimum wages implemented by states in 
the U.S. in 2016 and how that effects men and women differently, the variables harmonized 
in IPUMS-CPS make it approachable for me to capture the effect spatially. In January of 
2015, 21 states of the U.S. and the District of Columbia increased their minimum wages. 
The treatment states and control states are reported in Table 1.  
Incwage. This variable measures the annual wage and salary income for men and 
women in dollars. Freeman (1996) elucidates that the ultimate result of amendments in the 
minimum wages isn’t captured by its unintentional consequences on the employment 
figures but on the effectiveness of minimum wages to serve as a tool of redistribution to 
decrease inequity within our society. Given the best scenario, the effective implementation 
of minimum wages would will allocate the earnings distribution towards the lower wage 
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earners. Mincer (1974) evaluates the rates of return to education using the Mincerian 
earnings equation, where the dependent variable is the logarithm of wages or earnings and 
the explanatory variables include distinguished demographic characteristics such as 
number of years of schooling, sex, work experience etc. I include this variable to better 
account for the earning gains delivered by an increase in minimum wages for workers by 
accounting for several demographic characteristics. 
Sex. This variable is each individual’s gender. Anker (1997) states that historical 
literature on occupation segregation is not concerned with occupational segregation per se, 
but its impact on gender wage differentials. Given the differences in acquired labor market 
skills accounts for a substantial element of the gender wage disparity. If wages vary on the 
basis on gender orientation, this disparity would result in women receiving inferior pay. 
This variable would indicate the displacement of incwage between men and women in 
treatmenti states after the increase in minimum wages in 2015.  
Educ. This variable denotes the highest educational attainment of an individual, 
which is measured as the highest number of years at the school or college level. Mincer 
(1974) interprets the coefficient of education in the log wage regression as the main source 
of elevating productivity assuming that wages must only be proportional to productivity, 
by accounting for attributes observed by firms across industries. I’m assuming that there 
aren’t attributes proportional to productivity that are not accounted by firms incorporated 
in the Mincerian wage equation.  
Age. This variable provides information about an individual’s age at their last 
birthday. Mihăilă (2016) states that the gender wage gap remains inconsequential when 
employees are inexperienced and it enlarges with age. She elucidates that on the other hand 
gender wage gap for employees who work full time without any labor market disruptions 
declines with age. I will be dropping ages lower than 16 years old because the legal 
minimum wage to work full-time in the U.S is 16. My dataset includes information on the 
different ages at varying occupation levels across industries at a given point in time and it 
does not provide information on how employment for individuals varies across age. I use 
agedummyt to differentiate between individuals that will be a part of the labor market and 
those that will not be. Individuals younger than and equal to 66 years of age will receive 
the code 1 and individuals older than 66 years of age will receive the code 0. I choose 66 
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years of age as a determinant whether an individual will receive code 1 or 0 because the 
full retirement age in the U.S. is 66 years. It’s important to create this variable because 
different occupation levels in different industries have diverging peak earning years. I’m 
including a wide range of ages in my dataset because the emphasis on the peak earning 
years across industries is not within the scope of this paper.  
Industry. This variable states the type of industry in which an individual performed 
her primary occupation. This variable provides information on the type of work setting or 
sector and the occupation variable states an individual’s specific job responsibilities and 
functions. Gosling (1996) concludes that minimum wages would reduce income inequality 
amongst working families, as many low income earners are either single or have spouses 
that are low incomers. By incorporating this variable I could precisely examine the impact 
of an increase in minimum wages in industries that are dominated by working families such 
as the production or transportation industry.  
 Marst. This variable gives each individual’s current marital status and states 
whether their spouse is currently living in the same household. The majority of the 
individuals in my dataset are single (never married), divorced or married with their spouse 
currently living in the same household. Waldfogel (1998) elucidates that though gender 
differentials may have narrowed down both in the U.S and Great Britain, a substantial wage 
gap is prevalent between women with children and women without children. Although, he 
controlled for labor market experience and eradicated the wage effects of children, the 
unexplained impact of children remained. I do consider the effects of marriage on earnings 
as they may differ from the effects of children on earnings. To study the impact of 
minimum wages on one’s marital status I generate the marstdummyi variable to provide 
information on an individual’s marital status. Polachek (2004) argued that though wage 
disparities between men and women are trivial, wage disparities between men and married 
women have remained substantially significant. I will be focusing on individuals that are 
single (never married), divorced and married. Individuals that are single (never married) 
will receive the code 6, divorced individuals will receive the code 4 and married individuals 
will receive the code 1 based of the codes IPUMS-CPS has employed.  
Nchild. This variable is the number of own children in the household. I’ll be 
manipulating this variable in a way to account for time outside the labor market or time off 
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school depending for women depending on the number of own children. Michael and 
Lazear (1971) argue that the number and age composition of her children may affect a 
woman’s wage. The presence of young children increase’s the wife’s time demanded at 
home and reduces her availability to participate in the labor force. Gangl and Ziefle (2009) 
argue that because childbirth often necessitates mothers’ absolute withdrawal from the 
labor force for extended periods of time, the incidence of the costs associated with work 
interruption typically fall on mothers. One can also assume that the marital status and the 
presence of children is a crucial factor since the geographical factor is and her access to 
labor market exposure is likely to be influenced and often bound by the location of her 
husband’s job placement. I hypothesize that this would directly impact the annual and wage 
earnings that married women would earn on the basis of accumulated work experience. 
Sutter and Miller (1973) elucidate that the lifetime accumulated work experience between 
single and married women explain the difference between their median incomes. Their 
results conclude that the difference in the median income for women with varying martial 
statuses reduces as the gap between the lifetime work experience narrows. The remaining 
difference between single and married women was explained by examining who worked 
each year, as married women would be more likely to work part time for years when they’re 
expecting an offspring or looking after one.   
I incorporate nchilddummyi to know the number of own children in the household. 
This would help me provide information about the number of times women had to take 
time out off the labor market or off school based on the number of their own children. Also, 
because work experience required for occupation levels isn’t constant across industries. It 
will be more realistic to account for the disruption in the labor market or time taken off 
school for women and examine if this puts them at a disadvantage. Individuals will receive 
values 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 based on the number of their own children in the 
household.  
Occ2010. This variable provides information based on the occupation levels of 
individuals in different industries. These occupation levels are coded based on the Central 
Bureau’s 2010 occupation classification procedure. Card, Cardoso and Kline (2016) 
elucidate that there are massive earnings differential across various firms and 
establishments that sort employees into high and low establishments contributes to 
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inequality in earnings in the U.S as men are more likely to work in higher paying firms and 
capture a greater portion of the establishment premium than women. I include all 
occupation levels in the Production industry, the Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports and 
Media industry and the Transportation and Material Moving industry. The occ2010 
variable in IPUMS-CPS codes all occupation levels in each industry category. I focused on 
the impact of an increase in minimum wage on workers in these industries, as workers in 
this industry are a homogenous group of individuals undertaking comparatively similar job 
responsibilities and functions. Hakim (2006) elucidates that in several occupations, the 
highest recognition and accomplishment requires consistent dedication and extensive effort 
and artistic work of all kinds is one such example. Individuals whose artistic output is 
uncertain and infrequent are less likely to be in greater demand when compared to those 
with a competitive, appreciable and persistent output. Part-time workers in such fields 
cannot be excluded but it would be unlikely for them to acquire enormous appreciation for 
their work.  
Treatment groups. This variable incorporates the 21 states of the U.S. and the 
District of Columbia that increased their minimum wages in 2015. The treatment groups 
will capture the effect of an increase in minimum wages in states that increased their 
minimum wages compared to states that did not across time. Meyer (1995) states that 
treatment groups captures the causal effect of the treatment on the outcome of interest for 
unit i and period t and the treatment group can usually be defined by the variation in another 
variable such as the variation in minimum wages.  
Control groups. The variable includes the states of the U.S. that did not alter their 
minimum wages in 2015. The minimum wages in these states will remain the same before 
and after 2015. The control groups are comparison groups over the same time period as the 
before and after groups that have similar characteristics as the treatment groups. The only 
difference is that these groups are untreated groups when compared to the treatment groups. 
The difference-in-differences estimation to serve its true purpose expects intervention in 
treatment groups need to be unrelated with the outcome of interest and necessitates no 
spillover effects of the treatment groups in control groups. 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the general difference-in-differences 
population regression function.  
 18 
 
4     Regression Analysis  
I use multivariate regressions to explain the effect of an increase in minimum wages 
and how that affects gender differently. The following Equation 1 denotes my regression 
model. Using the difference-in-differences methodology, I will be evaluating the effect of 
an increase in minimum wages in states that increased their minimum wages compared to 
states that did not alter their minimum wages in 2015. The dependent variable is the 
incwagei that men and women earn in different industries and at diverse occupation levels. 
I will be using an alternative form, which has the log on the left-hand side of the equation. 
The interpretation of this variable is that if treatmenti changes by 1 unit, then incwagei 
would change in percentage values. Incwagei would change by β1*100 percent, keeping 
yeardummyt and interactionit constant for event unit that treatment increases. The first 
explanatory variable is the treatmentt and states that increased their minimum wages in 
2015 will be part of the treatment group. States that did not alter their minimum wages in 
2015 will be part of the control group. States that are part of the treatment group will be 
defined as treatmentt==1 on the basis of their state (FIPS code). States that are part of the 
control group will be defined as treatmentt==0 on the basis of their state (FIPS code) as 
well. 
The second explanatory variable is the yeardummyt variable, which is a time 
dummy. The yeardummyt takes the value 0 for years 2013 and 2014 that are years before 
the increase in minimum wages was implemented. For years 2015, 2016 and 2017, I 
generated yeardummyt==1 because the increase in the minimum wages in treatmentt states 
took place in January 2015. This would be the time period in which the effect of an increase 
in minimum wages on men and women would be observed in treatment groups when 
compared to no changes in the control groups. The interactionit is equal to the product of 
the treatmentt and the yeardummyt, which would capture the heterogeneous effects of an 
increase in minimum wages during 2015, 2016 and 2017 on men and women. I generated 
male==1 and female==0. 
 
ln(incwageit) = α + β1* treatmenti + β2* yeardummyt + β3* interactionit + ϵit     (1) 
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I expect the sign of the coefficient of the treatmenti to be positive across all the 3 
industries because that would reflect a positive relationship between an increase in 
minimum wages in treatment groups and the incwagei. I hypothesize the sign of the 
coefficient of the yeardummyt to be positive for all the 3 industries as well because that 
would explain that after an increase in minimum wages that took place in 2015, the 
incwagei would also increase. Also, I hypothesize the sign of the coefficient of the 
interactionit to be positive because the difference-in-differences analysis would evaluate 
the difference in treatment groups before and after the increase in minimum wages, the 
difference in control groups before and after and then take a difference of the two. Brülhart, 
Carrère and Trionfetti (2012)’s result elucidate that the estimate coefficient for the 
interaction term evaluates whether and how the dependent variable progressed differently 
in the treatment groups compared to control groups after the fall of the Iron Curtain in 
1990. A positive sign would indicate the effectiveness of an increase in minimum wages 
in treatment groups compared to control groups in 2015. I do expect the interactionit 
coefficient to be a high positive value for women when compared to men and anticipate 
even a higher value for married women when compared to married men. It would be 
rational to argue that women with household necessities and responsibilities tend to 
accumulate less labor market capital when compared to men and have less time to invest 
in job-specific training. As a result, do not land up in higher-earning occupational levels 
and are over-represented in lower-earning jobs in labor markets. Weichselbaumer and 
Winter-Ebmer (2005)’s results from their meta-analysis of 263 international gender wage 
gap studies conclude that during the 1990s women earned on average 26 percent less than 
men. I hypothesize the interactionit coefficient to be a high positive figure for married 
women with children when compared to married men with children across different 
industries and expect a higher positive value for divorced women as their own number of 
children increase. This would explain that parenthood advantages that are existent for men 
across industries, where as married women employed with similar human capital 
characteristics earn significantly less. Therefore, minimum wage impacts on the lower 
bottom end of the wage distribution are the greatest. The ϵit term is the stochastic error term 
in my model. 
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5     Robustness Checks  
Though the majority of the results reported in Tables 6 through 23 are significant, 
this does not imply that they are robust. I utilize the Annual Social and Economic 
Supplement Weight (ASECWT) incorporated in my dataset obtained from IPUMS-CPS to 
correct for heteroscedasticity by adjusting the individuals weights in the sample. Tables 24 
though 41 include the robust results testing for heteroscedasticity for men and women at 
different marital statuses and number of children. My results prior to correcting for 
heteroscedasticity indicate that my results were driven by analytical weights inflation. 
Tables 42 through 59 summarize the VIFs for all the explanatory variables in my final 
model and because the values of the VIFS for each explanatory variable are less than 5, I 
can conclude that there is no multicollinearity between the explanatory variables in my 
model.  
 
6     Results 
Tables 3, 4 and 5 report results from the log-linear regression for the impact on 
incwagei for single men and women in the Production industry, Arts, Design, 
Entertainment, Sports and Media industry and the Transportation and Material Moving 
industry at different occupational levels in treatmenti states. As shown in Table 3, the sign 
for the treatmenti variable, which indicates the states that increased their minimum wage, 
is negative. Therefore, a 1 unit change in the treatmenti coefficient decreases the incwagei 
in percent values. This is not a sign I expected for the treatmenti variable; respectively I 
expected incwagei of married and divorced women with children to increase the most. 
However, my results conclude that single women with one child and married women with 
one child, experienced the greatest decline in incwagei in treatmenti states. A 1 unit change 
in the treatmenti coefficient, decreased incwagei  of single women with one child by 6.38 
percent and married women with one child by 6.24 percent in the Production industry, 
significant at 1 percent level. This could be interpreted in the way that decreases in incwagei  
of single women with one child and married women with one child in treatment states 
could be redistributed to single men with no child and divorced men with one child as they 
experience the smallest decrease in incwagei . The yeardummyt variable indicates that the 
greatest increase in incwagei in 2015 is observed for single men with one child and married 
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women with one child. A 1 unit change in the yeardummyt coefficient increased incwagei 
for single men with one child and married women with one child by 4.32 percent, 
significant at 1 percent level. It’s intriguing how my results for single men and married 
women with one child are affected similarly given the significant difference in marital 
statuses between the two. My results for the interactionit variable conclude that the largest 
impact of an increase in minimum wages in 2015 is on single women with one child and 
divorced women with one child. A 1 unit change in the interactionit coefficient increased 
incwagei of single women with one child by 9.60 percent and divorced women with no 
child by 9.56 percent, significant at 1 percent level. The findings for divorced women with 
one child are consistent with the findings of Greene and Quester (1982) that conclude that 
wives employed in the labor market as a buffer against marital failure should be more 
interested than other wives in on-job training.   
The results for the Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports and Media industry are 
concluded in Table 4. Although, these results are positive insignificant I do observe an 
expected sign for the treatmenti variable. My results conclude that incwagei of divorced 
women with one child and single men with one child were the ones that were most affected. 
A 1 unit change in the treatmenti coefficient increased incwagei of divorced women with 
one child and single men with one child by 2.20 and 1.97 percent. The results for divorced 
women with one child are consistent with the literature on the wage penalty associated with 
motherhood. This price associated with being a mother that fathers don’t experience will 
impact the majority of women and exacerbate gender wage inequality. For divorced and 
single mothers, the penalty of motherhood could contribute to the gap in earnings of 
households run by a single women and households headed by a man. The yeardummyt 
variable has the greatest impact on the incwagei of married men with no child and single 
men with no child. A 1 unit change in the yeardummyt coefficient increased incwagei of 
married men with no child by 1.95 percent and single men with no child by 1.94 percent, 
significant at 1 percent level. These findings are consistent with the literature on marital 
wage premium for men indicating that causation might run from marriage to earnings. My 
results for the interactionit variable conclude that the implementation of an increase in 
minimum wages in 2015 had no impact on gender in the Arts, Design, Entertainment, 
Sports and Media industry. Though these results are negative insignificant, the largest 
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impact of an increase in minimum wages in 2015 is on single men with one child and 
divorced men with one child. A 1 unit change in the interactionit coefficient decreased 
incwagei of single men with one child by 9.86 percent and divorced men with one child by 
9.38 percent. These results are consistent with the findings of Dex, Sutherland and Joshi 
(2000). They conclude that the wage of worst paid men fell to meet the wages of the lower 
earnings of women, rather than the latter experiencing a positive advancement.  
The results for the Transportation and Material Moving industry are concluded in 
Table 5. For the treatmenti variable I do not observe an expected sign. The treatmenti 
variable substantially decreased incwagei of divorced men with one child and married men 
with one child. A 1 unit change in the treatmenti coefficient decreased incwagei of divorced 
men with one child by 9.09 percent and married men with one child by 8.99 percent, 
significant at 1 percent level. Hill (1979) concludes that married men have higher wages 
than divorced or separated men, who have higher average wages for single or non-married 
men. This decrease in incwagei of married men in treatmenti states would be justified as a 
decrease in their earnings would be allocated to higher earnings for divorced women with 
one child as divorced women with one child have the smallest decrease in incwagei in the 
treatmenti states. The yeardummyt variable has the greatest influence on the incwagei of 
single women with no child and divorced men with one child. A 1 unit change in the 
yeardummyt  coefficient increased incwagei of single women with no child and divorced 
men with one child by 7.91 percent, significant at 1 percent level. The interactionit variable 
indicates that an increase in minimum wages in 2015 is on incwagei of divorced men with 
one child and married men with one child. A 1 unit change in the interactionit coefficient 
increased incwagei of divorced men with one child by 6.80 percent and married men with 
one child by 6.69 percent, significant at 5 percent level. The findings for married men are 
consistent with Kenny (1983)’s study which explains that the marriage wage premium is a 
result of return for the higher human capital accumulation that married men make by 
working longer hours and gaining more labor market experience. 
Given that the R-squared values for all my models are between 0.2 – 0.4 %, this 
indicates the variation in incwagei that the independent variables explain collectively is 
low. I tabulated sex based on the varying occupational levels for the Production industry, 
Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports and Media industry and the Transportation and 
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Material Moving industry to know more about the number of observations across industries 
and their gender breakdown. In the Production industry, there were 25, 532 observations 
and out of which 17,913 were men and 7,619 were women. In the Arts, Design, 
Entertainment, Sports and Media industry, there were only 9,089 observations and out of 
which 4,668 were men and 4,421 were women. In the Transportation and Material Moving 
industry, the total number of observations are 29,185 and out of which 24,268 were men 
and 4,917 were women. These number of observations for men and women across 
industries would further decrease in number when accounting for different marital statuses, 
number of own children in the household and the age. This could also be the rationale for 
the R-squared being so low. However, previous quasi-experiments modeled by Leigh 
(2003) and Reeves et al. (2017) have also reported low values of R-squared. 
 
7     Discussion of Results 
Admittedly, there are a number of limitations in my study. In examining the effect 
of an increase in minimum wages on gender in 2015, my study only incorporates horizontal 
segregation across industries. The dataset I obtain from IPUMS-CPS lacks information on 
the hierarchical rankings of different occupational levels in different industries. The 
undisrupted full-time labor force participation of women when compared to men is not the 
only issue in the gender wage disparity. Hakim (1979) states that both horizontal 
segregation and vertical segregation exacerbate women’s lower earnings. I could have 
accounted for this problem if hierarchical rankings for different occupational levels across 
industries were incorporated in my dataset. Another limitation of my study is that I do not 
focus on a specific subgroup of age. I include individuals in my dataset that meet the age 
requirement to legally work full time in the U.S or are of an age less than the retirement 
age. As I reviewed the existing literature on the effect of age on wages and productivity it 
was difficult for me to establish how age solely would influence labor market productivity 
given that productivity is highly individualistic and also occupation and industry specific. 
To establish this relationship between age and productivity I would need to acquire data 
from the worker-firm matched data. Although, the increase in the minimum wage was not 
aimed directly at a specific subgroup of age it would be intriguing to further evaluate which 
subgroup of age is driving my results. This would also explain how employment elasticities 
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play a role depending on the context in which increase minimum wages are implemented. 
Card, Cardoso and Kline (2016) state that if women have a less elastic job mobility 
arrangement with reference to wages and have a flatter earnings profile than men then 
gender wage disparities across employers may intensify.  
Another limitation is that there could be measurement errors inculcated in my 
dataset. During 2013-2017, which is the time period of my study, there could have been 
changes in descriptions or variations in survey methods that may bring out discrepancies 
in the studied variables. To add on to the validity of my results, it is necessary for me to 
include average full-time and part-time employment trends for men and women or number 
of hours worked at every occupation level before and after in treatment and control states. 
This would conclude whether the preferences or incentives for individuals regarding the 
number of hours they choose to work and if trends in average full-time and part-time 
employment for men and women across industries changed after an increase in minimum 
wages in 2015. I also do not account for different interactionit variables for different 
treatment states to account for the divergence in the effect of the treatmenti that may differ 
across geographical locations.  
As my study only focused on the effect of a rise in the minimum wages on gender 
in 2015, there are several possible extensions of my paper. A basic extension of this paper 
is to evaluate the costs associated with raising the minimum wage against the higher 
earnings redistributed to lower wage earners. This requires learning more about workers 
who are earning the minimum wage and how household income is affected by minimum 
wage increases. Another potential extension of this paper is to examine the effect of an 
increase in minimum wages and the impact it has on public health and goods provision 
across states similarly to Leigh, Leigh and Du (2018)’s study. In my study because I include 
a wide range of ages it would be intriguing to examine if firms across industries alter the 
age structure of their organizations’ workforce as a result of an increase in the cost of 
employing entry-level workers? Simon and Kaestner (2004) estimate the effect of 
minimum wages on the provision of employer health insurance and pension coverage. 
Their analysis also investigates compensating gender wage differentials for fringe benefits. 
Another potential aspect is to explore how women’s representation in higher-earning 
positions and powerful roles affect the gender wage gap. Hirsch (2013) by utilizing 
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employer-employee data concludes that women’s representation in upper-level German 
management positions reduces the gender wage gap. Stainback et al. (2016)’s findings 
conclude that women’s access to upper-level management positions is likely to reduce 
gendered biases and inequalities. Another way of examining the impact of an increase in 
minimum wage on gender would be through studying the breakdown of what percent of 
the payroll taxes by men and women are allocated in funding social security every month.  
One other extension is to further examine the effect of minimum wages and the 
impact it has on gender in emerging economies. It could be argued that larger effects of 
minimum wages are hypothesized in emerging economies as minimum wages are often set 
at a higher level or because a larger percentage of the workforce is unskilled and are earning 
wages near the minimum wage. However, the implementation of minimum wages in 
emerging economies might be challenging to enforce due to the existence of a substantial 
informal sector. In addition, future studies may incorporate the rippling effect of minimum 
wages across industries that are not affected by minimum wages and how this might make 
certain states or countries less attractive for business and expansion locations. Grossman 
(1983) argues that an altered minimum wage would initiate a chain reaction determined by 
the elasticity of effort if individuals only make comparisons with the occupation levels they 
think to be directly below. This explains that workers at varying occupational levels 
compare their earnings to different reference groups but future research on the rippling 
effect across industries that are not affected by the minimum wage and all income groups 
is still sparse. Another way to advance the literature would be through identifying low wage 
earners and lower income brackets rather than incorporating food or retail industry workers 
as proxies. By accurately identifying lower income groups, the effect of an increase in 
minimum wage on employment would help determine a more accurate sense of how 
minimum wages influence the intentional targets of a minimum wage increase. Future 
studies could also study for the impact of an increase in minimum wages on preponing or 
delaying the retirement age depending on gender. In order to obtain and qualify for social 
security retirement benefits, one needs at least 40 credits that are equivalent to 10 years of 
work for the majority of Americans. To count towards your highest benefit levels, 35 years 
of your highest earnings are required. If the majority of women tend to earn lower wages, 
then in order to receive their highest levels of social security retirement benefits, women 
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might delay their retirement age. To evaluate the impact of an increase in minimum wages 
on delaying or preponing the retirement age based on gender could explain a rationale 
behind the heterogeneous effects of minimum wages across industries. 
 
8     Conclusion 
 
 Unlike previous literature, my study examines the effect of an increase in minimum 
wages on gender across all states of the U.S. by exploiting the natural experiment 
opportunity using the difference-in-differences estimation. The increase in minimum 
wages across states was implemented in 2015 and the states that increased their minimum 
wages were part of the treatment group and states that did not were part of the control 
group. This variation in wages caused by a rise in the minimum wages is exogenous to 
productivity and serves as a great opportunity to examine the effect of wages increases on 
gender. I obtain my dataset from IPUMS-CPS over the period 2013 to 2017 and I examine 
the effect of an increase in minimum wages on gender in the Production industry, the Arts, 
Design, Entertainment, Sports and Media industry and the Transportation and Material 
Moving industry in the U.S. Using the multivariate regressions to obtain difference-in-
differences estimates, my results show that the largest impact of an increase in minimum 
wages in 2015 in the Production industry is on single women with one child and divorced 
women with one child. The incwagei of single women with one child increased by 9.60 
percent and incwagei of divorced women with one child increased by 9.56 percent, 
significant at 1 percent level. My results for the Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports and 
Media industry report that the implementation of an increase in minimum wages in 2015 
had no impact on the incwagei of either men or women with different marital statuses or 
number of children. Although, the results were negative significant, the largest impact of 
an increase in minimum wages in 2015 is on single men with one child and divorced men 
with one child. The incwagei of single men with one child decreased by 9.86 percent and 
the incwagei of divorced men with one child decreased by 9.38 percent.  
My results across all three industries conclude that women are not specifically 
affected by the implementation of an increase in minimum wages in the U.S in 2015. This 
could be because women with substantial work experienced are on average more qualified 
and hold higher occupation statuses when compared to men or women with fewer careers 
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enhancing experiences. On the other hand, it could also be the case that women with 
different marital statuses with one or more number of children might be relying on 
government assistant programs and child care subsidies given that they work some 
minimum number of hours. Assuming that these women might fall under a subgroup of 
individuals that receive need and assistance programs from the federal government.  
Based on my findings, future researchers can investigate the rippling effect of 
minimum wages across industries that are not affected by minimum wages and how this 
might make certain geographical locations much more beneficial for expansion. Future 
studies on the impact of an increase in minimum wages on delaying or preponing the 
retirement age based on gender could also be evaluated. Future research also needs to shed 
light on the most accurate methodology to model the effect of minimum wages as this could 
primarily influence a study’s results. The prevalent literature on the methodologies for 
estimating the effectiveness of minimum wages as a tool of redistribution raise questions 
on whether a two-way fixed effects model or a difference-in-differences estimator is a 
better fit to examine impacts. However, the public policy of an increase in minimum wages 
is not a solution to universal poverty and depressed wages across the world. It does not 
boost a country’s GDP or the rate of its capital productivity. Minimum wages are perceived 
as a tool of redistributing income to lower wage earners and are associated with wage 
inequality, though the magnitude of this effect is controversial. However, there may be 
uncertainty and risks of inefficient outcomes, and may not help those it is expected to help. 
More research is needed in the area of distinguishing lower wage earning groups before 
minimum wages can be more credibly rationalized as a tool for redistribution and poverty 
alleviation strategy.  
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Appendix 
Table 1: Treatment and Control States 
States Treatment/Controls States 
AK, AZ, AR, CO, CT, FL, HI, MD, MA, 
MO, MT, NE, NJ, NY, OH, OR, RI, SD, 
VT, WA, WV and D.C 
Treatment States 
AL, CA, DE, GA, ID, IL, IA, KS, KY, LA, 
ME, MI, MS, NH, NM, NC, ND, OK, PA, 
SC, TN, TX, UT, VA, WI, WY, AS, GU, 
MP, PR, VI, UM, FM, MH, PW 
Control States 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Robust Results from the Production Industry  
 
 (Single Men-
No child) 
(Single 
Men-1child) 
(Single 
Women-No 
Child) 
(Single 
Women-1 
child) 
(Divorced 
Men-No 
child) 
(Divorced 
Men-1 
Child) 
(Divorced 
Women-No 
child) 
(Divorced 
Women-1 
child) 
(Married 
Men-No 
child) 
(Married 
Men-1 
child) 
(Married 
Women-
No child) 
(Married 
Women- 1 
child) 
VARIABLES logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
             
treatment -0.0595*** -0.0490*** -0.0598*** -0.0638*** -0.0594*** -0.0516*** -0.0598*** -0.0623*** -0.0595*** -0.0541*** -0.0605*** -0.0624*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0179) (0.0178) (0.0179) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0179) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0178) 
yeardummy 0.0417*** 0.0432*** 0.0421*** 0.0389*** 0.0418*** 0.0429*** 0.0422*** 0.0383*** 0.0419*** 0.0429*** 0.0420*** 0.0432*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) 
interaction 0.0921*** 0.0809*** 0.0919*** 0.0960*** 0.0918*** 0.0836*** 0.0920*** 0.0956*** 0.0921*** 0.0880*** 0.0926*** 0.0929*** 
 (0.0251) (0.0251) (0.0251) (0.0252) (0.0251) (0.0251) (0.0251) (0.0252) (0.0251) (0.0251) (0.0250) (0.0251) 
Constant 10.26*** 10.26*** 10.25*** 10.26*** 10.26*** 10.26*** 10.25*** 10.26*** 10.26*** 10.26*** 10.26*** 10.26*** 
 (0.00950) (0.00950) (0.00951) (0.00953) (0.00950) (0.00949) (0.00951) (0.00954) (0.00949) (0.00950) (0.00949) (0.00949) 
             
Observations 23,795 23,675 23,740 23,582 23,800 23,696 23,744 23,597 23,814 23,743 23,827 23,775 
R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Observations Mean  Std. Dev. Min  Max 
logincwage 416,261 10.25 1.18 0 14.15 
treatment 672,606 0.40 0.49 0 1 
yeardummy 672,606 0.58 0.49 0 1 
interaction 672,606 0.23 0.42 0 1 
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Table 4: Robust Results from the Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports and Media Industry 
 (Single Men-
No child) 
(Single 
Men-1child) 
(Single 
Women-No 
Child) 
(Single 
Women-1 
child) 
(Divorced 
Men-No 
child) 
(Divorced 
Men-1 
Child) 
(Divorced 
Women-No 
child) 
(Divorced 
Women-1 
child) 
(Married 
Men-No 
child) 
(Married 
Men-1 
child) 
(Married 
Women-
No child) 
(Married 
Women- 1 
child) 
VARIABLES logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
             
treatment 0.0146 0.0197 0.0117 0.0172 0.0146 0.0193 0.0117 0.0220 0.0153 0.0147 0.0148 0.00131 
 (0.0496) (0.0495) (0.0497) (0.0498) (0.0497) (0.0495) (0.0497) (0.0497) (0.0496) (0.0498) (0.0496) (0.0495) 
yeardummy 0.194*** 0.191*** 0.183*** 0.187*** 0.191*** 0.187*** 0.184*** 0.188*** 0.195*** 0.193*** 0.188*** 0.186*** 
 (0.0417) (0.0416) (0.0418) (0.0419) (0.0417) (0.0416) (0.0418) (0.0418) (0.0417) (0.0419) (0.0417) (0.0416) 
interaction -0.0844 -0.0986 -0.0732 -0.0796 -0.0813 -0.0938 -0.0746 -0.0817 -0.0857 -0.0825 -0.0781 -0.0647 
 (0.0697) (0.0696) (0.0699) (0.0699) (0.0697) (0.0696) (0.0699) (0.0698) (0.0696) (0.0700) (0.0697) (0.0695) 
Constant 10.18*** 10.20*** 10.18*** 10.18*** 10.18*** 10.20*** 10.18*** 10.18*** 10.18*** 10.18*** 10.18*** 10.19*** 
 (0.0300) (0.0300) (0.0301) (0.0302) (0.0301) (0.0300) (0.0301) (0.0301) (0.0300) (0.0301) (0.0301) (0.0300) 
             
Observations 6,280 6,221 6,265 6,215 6,282 6,224 6,267 6,216 6,287 6,255 6,290 6,266 
R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Robust Results from the Transportation and Material Moving Industry 
 (Single Men-
No child) 
(Single 
Men-1child) 
(Single 
Women-No 
Child) 
(Single 
Women-1 
child) 
(Divorced 
Men-No 
child) 
(Divorced 
Men-1 
Child) 
(Divorced 
Women-No 
child) 
(Divorced 
Women-1 
child) 
(Married 
Men-No 
child) 
(Married 
Men-1 
child) 
(Married 
Women-
No child) 
(Married 
Women- 1 
child) 
VARIABLES logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
             
treatment -0.0874*** -0.0880*** -0.0823*** -0.0790*** -0.0872*** -0.0909*** -0.0826*** -0.0752*** -0.0870*** -0.0899*** -0.0873*** -0.0859*** 
 (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0197) (0.0195) (0.0194) (0.0195) (0.0197) (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0195) 
yeardummy 0.0765*** 0.0782*** 0.0791*** 0.0731*** 0.0765*** 0.0791*** 0.0788*** 0.0772*** 0.0767*** 0.0770*** 0.0780*** 0.0773*** 
 (0.0154) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0156) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0155) (0.0156) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0155) (0.0155) 
interaction 0.0621** 0.0654** 0.0577** 0.0556** 0.0620** 0.0680** 0.0575** 0.0484* 0.0616** 0.0669** 0.0624** 0.0610** 
 (0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0271) (0.0274) (0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0271) (0.0274) (0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0271) 
Constant 10.07*** 10.07*** 10.07*** 10.08*** 10.07*** 10.07*** 10.07*** 10.08*** 10.07*** 10.07*** 10.07*** 10.07*** 
 (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0111) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0111) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) 
             
Observations 24,293 24,219 24,145 23,592 24,293 24,229 24,158 23,636 24,300 24,247 24,272 24,131 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Production Industry – Results without correcting for Heteroscedasticity 
 
Table 6 : Heterogeneous effects on Single Men in the Production Industry 
 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment -0.0500*** -0.0500*** -0.0452** -0.0448** -0.0448** 
 (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184) 
yeardummy 0.0658*** 0.0658*** 0.0657*** 0.0659*** 0.0658*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138) 
interaction 0.0631*** 0.0631*** 0.0595** 0.0593** 0.0595** 
 (0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0240) 
Constant 10.25*** 10.25*** 10.25*** 10.25*** 10.25*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105) 
      
Observations 23,792 23,792 23,639 23,631 23,627 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: Heterogeneous effects on Single Women in the Production Industry 
 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment -0.0514*** -0.0512*** -0.0512*** -0.0514*** -0.0513*** 
 (0.0183) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184) 
yeardummy 0.0656*** 0.0641*** 0.0640*** 0.0639*** 0.0640*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0139) 
interaction 0.0643*** 0.0642*** 0.0642*** 0.0643*** 0.0644*** 
 (0.0240) (0.0241) (0.0241) (0.0241) (0.0241) 
Constant 10.25*** 10.25*** 10.25*** 10.25*** 10.25*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106) 
      
Observations 23,738 23,568 23,528 23,503 23,503 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Heterogeneous effects on Divorced Men in the Production Industry 
 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment -0.0500*** -0.0464** -0.0452** -0.0448** -0.0448** 
 (0.0183) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184) 
yeardummy 0.0658*** 0.0661*** 0.0657*** 0.0659*** 0.0658*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138) 
interaction 0.0631*** 0.0608** 0.0595** 0.0593** 0.0595** 
 (0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0240) 
Constant 10.25*** 10.25*** 10.25*** 10.25*** 10.25*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105) 
      
Observations 23,792 23,662 23,639 23,631 23,627 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9: Heterogeneous effects on Divorced Women in the Production Industry 
 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment -0.0514*** -0.0512*** -0.0512*** -0.0514*** -0.0513*** 
 (0.0183) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184) 
yeardummy 0.0656*** 0.0641*** 0.0640*** 0.0639*** 0.0640*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0139) 
interaction 0.0643*** 0.0642*** 0.0642*** 0.0643*** 0.0644*** 
 (0.0240) (0.0241) (0.0241) (0.0241) (0.0241) 
Constant 10.25*** 10.25*** 10.25*** 10.25*** 10.25*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106) 
      
Observations 23,738 23,568 23,528 23,503 23,503 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: Heterogeneous effects on Married Men in the Production Industry 
 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment -0.0518*** -0.0518*** -0.0518*** -0.0518*** -0.0518*** 
 (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0183) 
yeardummy 0.0660*** 0.0665*** 0.0664*** 0.0664*** 0.0664*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138) 
interaction 0.0645*** 0.0647*** 0.0648*** 0.0647*** 0.0648*** 
 (0.0239) (0.0239) (0.0239) (0.0239) (0.0239) 
Constant 10.25*** 10.25*** 10.25*** 10.25*** 10.25*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105) 
      
Observations 23,841 23,830 23,827 23,828 23,827 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 11: Heterogeneous effects on Married Women in the Production Industry 
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 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment -0.0517*** -0.0518*** -0.0517*** -0.0517*** -0.0517*** 
 (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0183) 
yeardummy 0.0661*** 0.0662*** 0.0662*** 0.0662*** 0.0662*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138) 
interaction 0.0644*** 0.0645*** 0.0645*** 0.0645*** 0.0645*** 
 (0.0239) (0.0239) (0.0239) (0.0239) (0.0239) 
Constant 10.25*** 10.25*** 10.25*** 10.25*** 10.25*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105) 
      
Observations 23,841 23,829 23,825 23,825 23,825 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports and Media Industry - Results without 
correcting for Heteroscedasticity 
 
Table 12: Heterogeneous effects on Single Men in the Arts, Design, Entertainment, 
Sports and Media Industry 
 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment 0.142*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 
 (0.0524) (0.0525) (0.0525) (0.0525) (0.0525) 
yeardummy 0.171*** 0.170*** 0.174*** 0.176*** 0.175*** 
 (0.0450) (0.0451) (0.0451) (0.0451) (0.0451) 
interaction -0.155** -0.164** -0.168** -0.169** -0.168** 
 (0.0686) (0.0688) (0.0688) (0.0688) (0.0688) 
Constant 10.18*** 10.19*** 10.19*** 10.19*** 10.19*** 
 (0.0345) (0.0346) (0.0346) (0.0346) (0.0346) 
      
Observations 6,280 6,210 6,206 6,204 6,202 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 13 : Heterogeneous effects on Single Women in the Arts, Design, Entertainment, 
Sports and Media Industry 
 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment 0.137*** 0.135** 0.135** 0.134** 0.134** 
 (0.0525) (0.0527) (0.0527) (0.0527) (0.0527) 
yeardummy 0.161*** 0.169*** 0.167*** 0.166*** 0.165*** 
 (0.0451) (0.0451) (0.0452) (0.0452) (0.0452) 
interaction -0.143** -0.149** -0.148** -0.145** -0.145** 
 (0.0688) (0.0689) (0.0690) (0.0690) (0.0690) 
Constant 10.19*** 10.18*** 10.18*** 10.18*** 10.18*** 
 (0.0346) (0.0346) (0.0346) (0.0346) (0.0346) 
      
Observations 6,265 6,206 6,192 6,186 6,185 
R-squared 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 14 : Heterogeneous effects on Divorced Men in the Arts, Design, Entertainment, 
Sports and Media Industry 
 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment 0.142*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 
 (0.0524) (0.0525) (0.0525) (0.0525) (0.0525) 
yeardummy 0.171*** 0.170*** 0.174*** 0.176*** 0.175*** 
 (0.0450) (0.0451) (0.0451) (0.0451) (0.0451) 
interaction -0.155** -0.164** -0.168** -0.169** -0.168** 
 (0.0686) (0.0688) (0.0688) (0.0688) (0.0688) 
Constant 10.18*** 10.19*** 10.19*** 10.19*** 10.19*** 
 (0.0345) (0.0346) (0.0346) (0.0346) (0.0346) 
      
Observations 6,280 6,210 6,206 6,204 6,202 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 15: Heterogeneous effects on Divorced Women in the Arts, Design, Entertainment, 
Sports and Media Industry 
 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment 0.137*** 0.135** 0.135** 0.134** 0.134** 
 (0.0525) (0.0527) (0.0527) (0.0527) (0.0527) 
yeardummy 0.161*** 0.169*** 0.167*** 0.166*** 0.165*** 
 (0.0451) (0.0451) (0.0452) (0.0452) (0.0452) 
interaction -0.143** -0.149** -0.148** -0.145** -0.145** 
 (0.0688) (0.0689) (0.0690) (0.0690) (0.0690) 
Constant 10.19*** 10.18*** 10.18*** 10.18*** 10.18*** 
 (0.0346) (0.0346) (0.0346) (0.0346) (0.0346) 
      
Observations 6,265 6,206 6,192 6,186 6,185 
R-squared 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 16: Heterogeneous effects on Married Men in the Arts, Design, Entertainment, 
Sports and Media Industry 
 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment 0.140*** 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.141*** 
 (0.0524) (0.0525) (0.0525) (0.0525) (0.0525) 
yeardummy 0.167*** 0.166*** 0.166*** 0.166*** 0.166*** 
 (0.0450) (0.0450) (0.0450) (0.0450) (0.0450) 
interaction -0.151** -0.148** -0.148** -0.148** -0.148** 
 (0.0686) (0.0687) (0.0687) (0.0687) (0.0687) 
Constant 10.18*** 10.18*** 10.18*** 10.18*** 10.18*** 
 (0.0345) (0.0346) (0.0346) (0.0346) (0.0346) 
      
Observations 6,294 6,283 6,283 6,283 6,283 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 17: Heterogeneous effects on Married Women in the Arts, Design, Entertainment, 
Sports and Media Industry 
 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment 0.140*** 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.135*** 
 (0.0524) (0.0524) (0.0524) (0.0524) (0.0524) 
yeardummy 0.167*** 0.169*** 0.169*** 0.169*** 0.169*** 
 (0.0450) (0.0449) (0.0449) (0.0449) (0.0449) 
interaction -0.151** -0.148** -0.148** -0.148** -0.148** 
 (0.0686) (0.0686) (0.0686) (0.0686) (0.0686) 
Constant 10.18*** 10.18*** 10.18*** 10.18*** 10.18*** 
 (0.0345) (0.0345) (0.0345) (0.0345) (0.0345) 
      
Observations 6,293 6,284 6,285 6,284 6,284 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
Transportation and Material Moving Industry - Results without correcting for 
Heteroscedasticity 
 
Table 18: Hetergogenous effects on Single Men in the Transportation and Material 
Moving Industry 
 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment -0.0331 -0.0332 -0.0332 -0.0334 -0.0334 
 (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0207) 
yeardummy 0.104*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0164) 
interaction 0.00594 0.00741 0.00723 0.00705 0.00739 
 (0.0269) (0.0269) (0.0269) (0.0269) (0.0269) 
Constant 10.07*** 10.07*** 10.08*** 10.08*** 10.08*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) 
      
Observations 24,293 24,219 24,202 24,202 24,201 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
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Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 19: Hetergogenous effects on Single Women in the Transportation and Material 
Moving Industry 
 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment -0.0294 -0.0278 -0.0280 -0.0265 -0.0272 
 (0.0208) (0.0209) (0.0210) (0.0210) (0.0210) 
yeardummy 0.107*** 0.104*** 0.105*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 
 (0.0165) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0166) 
interaction 0.00244 0.00124 0.00163 0.000167 0.000934 
 (0.0270) (0.0273) (0.0273) (0.0274) (0.0274) 
Constant 10.07*** 10.08*** 10.08*** 10.08*** 10.08*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0127) (0.0127) 
      
Observations 24,145 23,592 23,516 23,476 23,474 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
Table 20: Hetergogenous effects on Divorced Men in the Transportation and Material 
Moving Industry 
 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment -0.0328 -0.0343* -0.0341* -0.0342* -0.0342* 
 (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0207) 
yeardummy 0.104*** 0.107*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0164) 
interaction 0.00578 0.00840 0.00807 0.00789 0.00823 
 (0.0269) (0.0269) (0.0269) (0.0269) (0.0269) 
Constant 10.07*** 10.07*** 10.08*** 10.08*** 10.08*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) 
      
Observations 24,293 24,229 24,212 24,212 24,211 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 21: Hetergogenous effects on Divorced Women in the Transportation and Material 
Moving Industry 
 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment -0.0298 -0.0267 -0.0273 -0.0258 -0.0265 
 (0.0208) (0.0209) (0.0210) (0.0210) (0.0210) 
yeardummy 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 
 (0.0165) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0166) 
interaction 0.00221 -0.00280 -0.00278 -0.00420 -0.00344 
 (0.0270) (0.0273) (0.0273) (0.0274) (0.0274) 
Constant 10.07*** 10.08*** 10.08*** 10.08*** 10.08*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0127) 
      
Observations 24,158 23,636 23,566 23,529 23,527 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 22: Heterogeneous effects on Married Men in the Transportation and Material 
Moving Industry 
 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment -0.0325 -0.0334 -0.0331 -0.0331 -0.0331 
 (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0207) 
yeardummy 0.104*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0164) 
interaction 0.00518 0.00785 0.00753 0.00755 0.00755 
 (0.0269) (0.0269) (0.0269) (0.0269) (0.0269) 
Constant 10.07*** 10.07*** 10.07*** 10.07*** 10.07*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) 
      
Observations 24,300 24,247 24,232 24,231 24,231 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 23: Heterogeneous effects on Married Women in the Transportation and Material 
Moving Industry 
 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment -0.0326 -0.0319 -0.0317 -0.0317 -0.0317 
 (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0208) (0.0208) (0.0208) 
yeardummy 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.106*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0164) 
interaction 0.00593 0.00461 0.00492 0.00502 0.00502 
 (0.0269) (0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0270) 
Constant 10.07*** 10.08*** 10.07*** 10.07*** 10.07*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) 
      
Observations 24,272 24,131 24,099 24,093 24,093 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Robustness Checks – Heteroskedasticity 
 
Robust Results for the Production Industry  
 
Table 24: Robust heterogeneous effects on Single Men in the Production Industry 
 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment -0.0595*** -0.0490*** -0.0489*** -0.0485*** -0.0485*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0179) 
yeardummy 0.0417*** 0.0432*** 0.0426*** 0.0426*** 0.0427*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) 
interaction 0.0921*** 0.0809*** 0.0812*** 0.0808*** 0.0808*** 
 (0.0251) (0.0251) (0.0251) (0.0251) (0.0251) 
Constant 10.26*** 10.26*** 10.26*** 10.26*** 10.26*** 
 (0.00950) (0.00950) (0.00950) (0.00950) (0.00950) 
      
Observations 23,795 23,675 23,654 23,645 23,642 
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R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 25: Robust heterogeneous effects on Single Women in the Production Industry 
 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment -0.0598*** -0.0638*** -0.0636*** -0.0637*** -0.0636*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0179) 
yeardummy 0.0421*** 0.0389*** 0.0391*** 0.0392*** 0.0392*** 
 (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0134) 
interaction 0.0919*** 0.0960*** 0.0963*** 0.0960*** 0.0960*** 
 (0.0251) (0.0252) (0.0252) (0.0252) (0.0252) 
Constant 10.25*** 10.26*** 10.26*** 10.26*** 10.26*** 
 (0.00951) (0.00953) (0.00954) (0.00954) (0.00954) 
      
Observations 23,740 23,582 23,544 23,519 23,519 
R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 26: Robust heterogeneous effects on Divorced Men in the Production Industry 
 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment -0.0594*** -0.0516*** -0.0515*** -0.0511*** -0.0511*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0178) 
yeardummy 0.0418*** 0.0429*** 0.0424*** 0.0425*** 0.0425*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) 
interaction 0.0918*** 0.0836*** 0.0837*** 0.0832*** 0.0832*** 
 (0.0251) (0.0251) (0.0251) (0.0251) (0.0251) 
Constant 10.26*** 10.26*** 10.26*** 10.26*** 10.26*** 
 (0.00950) (0.00949) (0.00950) (0.00949) (0.00950) 
      
Observations 23,800 23,696 23,679 23,672 23,668 
R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 27: Robust heterogeneous effects on Divorced Women in the Production Industry 
 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment -0.0598*** -0.0623*** -0.0628*** -0.0626*** -0.0625*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0179) 
yeardummy 0.0422*** 0.0383*** 0.0379*** 0.0384*** 0.0384*** 
 (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0134) 
interaction 0.0920*** 0.0956*** 0.0966*** 0.0960*** 0.0961*** 
 (0.0251) (0.0252) (0.0252) (0.0252) (0.0252) 
Constant 10.25*** 10.26*** 10.26*** 10.26*** 10.26*** 
 (0.00951) (0.00954) (0.00954) (0.00955) (0.00955) 
      
Observations 23,744 23,597 23,561 23,537 23,537 
R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 28: Robust heterogeneous effects on Married Men in the Production Industry 
 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment -0.0595*** -0.0541*** -0.0540*** -0.0536*** -0.0536*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0178) 
yeardummy 0.0419*** 0.0429*** 0.0425*** 0.0426*** 0.0426*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0134) (0.0134) 
interaction 0.0921*** 0.0880*** 0.0882*** 0.0877*** 0.0878*** 
 (0.0251) (0.0251) (0.0251) (0.0251) (0.0251) 
Constant 10.26*** 10.26*** 10.26*** 10.26*** 10.26*** 
 (0.00949) (0.00950) (0.00951) (0.00951) (0.00951) 
      
Observations 23,814 23,743 23,733 23,725 23,724 
R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 29: Robust heterogeneous effects on Married Women in the Production Industry 
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 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment -0.0605*** -0.0624*** -0.0617*** -0.0620*** -0.0620*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0178) 
yeardummy 0.0420*** 0.0432*** 0.0440*** 0.0436*** 0.0436*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) 
interaction 0.0926*** 0.0929*** 0.0920*** 0.0924*** 0.0924*** 
 (0.0250) (0.0251) (0.0251) (0.0251) (0.0251) 
Constant 10.26*** 10.26*** 10.26*** 10.26*** 10.26*** 
 (0.00949) (0.00949) (0.00950) (0.00950) (0.00950) 
      
Observations 23,827 23,775 23,761 23,759 23,759 
R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robust Results for the Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports and Media Industry 
 
Table 30: Robust heterogeneous effects on Single Men in the Arts, Design, 
Entertainment, Sports and Media Industry 
 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment 0.0146 0.0197 0.0207 0.0201 0.0201 
 (0.0496) (0.0495) (0.0495) (0.0495) (0.0495) 
yeardummy 0.194*** 0.191*** 0.198*** 0.198*** 0.198*** 
 (0.0417) (0.0416) (0.0416) (0.0416) (0.0416) 
interaction -0.0844 -0.0986 -0.106 -0.106 -0.105 
 (0.0697) (0.0696) (0.0695) (0.0696) (0.0696) 
Constant 10.18*** 10.20*** 10.20*** 10.20*** 10.20*** 
 (0.0300) (0.0300) (0.0300) (0.0300) (0.0300) 
      
Observations 6,280 6,221 6,217 6,215 6,213 
R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 31: Robust heterogeneous effects on Single Women in the Arts, Design, 
Entertainment, Sports and Media Industry 
 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment 0.0117 0.0172 0.0148 0.0145 0.0145 
 (0.0497) (0.0498) (0.0498) (0.0498) (0.0498) 
yeardummy 0.183*** 0.187*** 0.184*** 0.183*** 0.183*** 
 (0.0418) (0.0419) (0.0419) (0.0419) (0.0419) 
interaction -0.0732 -0.0796 -0.0795 -0.0772 -0.0766 
 (0.0699) (0.0699) (0.0700) (0.0700) (0.0700) 
Constant 10.18*** 10.18*** 10.18*** 10.18*** 10.18*** 
 (0.0301) (0.0302) (0.0302) (0.0302) (0.0302) 
      
Observations 6,265 6,215 6,201 6,195 6,194 
R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 32: Robust heterogeneous effects on Divorced Men in the Arts, Design, 
Entertainment, Sports and Media Industry 
 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment 0.0146 0.0193 0.0204 0.0197 0.0197 
 (0.0497) (0.0495) (0.0495) (0.0495) (0.0495) 
yeardummy 0.191*** 0.187*** 0.191*** 0.191*** 0.191*** 
 (0.0417) (0.0416) (0.0416) (0.0416) (0.0417) 
interaction -0.0813 -0.0938 -0.0982 -0.0983 -0.0974 
 (0.0697) (0.0696) (0.0696) (0.0696) (0.0696) 
Constant 10.18*** 10.20*** 10.20*** 10.20*** 10.20*** 
 (0.0301) (0.0300) (0.0300) (0.0300) (0.0300) 
      
Observations 6,282 6,224 6,222 6,220 6,218 
R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 33: Robust heterogeneous effects on Divorced Women in the Arts, Design, 
Entertainment, Sports and Media Industry 
 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment 0.0117 0.0220 0.0196 0.0192 0.0192 
 (0.0497) (0.0497) (0.0498) (0.0498) (0.0498) 
yeardummy 0.184*** 0.188*** 0.187*** 0.186*** 0.185*** 
 (0.0418) (0.0418) (0.0418) (0.0419) (0.0419) 
interaction -0.0746 -0.0817 -0.0830 -0.0807 -0.0801 
 (0.0699) (0.0698) (0.0699) (0.0700) (0.0700) 
Constant 10.18*** 10.18*** 10.18*** 10.18*** 10.18*** 
 (0.0301) (0.0301) (0.0301) (0.0302) (0.0302) 
      
Observations 6,267 6,216 6,204 6,198 6,197 
R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 34: Robust heterogeneous effects on Married Men in the Arts, Design, 
Entertainment, Sports and Media Industry 
 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment 0.0153 0.0147 0.0152 0.0152 0.0152 
 (0.0496) (0.0498) (0.0497) (0.0497) (0.0497) 
yeardummy 0.195*** 0.193*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 
 (0.0417) (0.0419) (0.0418) (0.0418) (0.0418) 
interaction -0.0857 -0.0825 -0.0891 -0.0889 -0.0889 
 (0.0696) (0.0700) (0.0699) (0.0699) (0.0699) 
Constant 10.18*** 10.18*** 10.18*** 10.18*** 10.18*** 
 (0.0300) (0.0301) (0.0301) (0.0301) (0.0301) 
      
Observations 6,287 6,255 6,250 6,249 6,249 
R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 35: Robust heterogeneous effects on Married Women in the Arts, Design, 
Entertainment, Sports and Media Industry 
 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment 0.0148 0.00131 0.00131 0.00131 0.00131 
 (0.0496) (0.0495) (0.0495) (0.0495) (0.0495) 
yeardummy 0.188*** 0.186*** 0.185*** 0.184*** 0.184*** 
 (0.0417) (0.0416) (0.0416) (0.0416) (0.0416) 
interaction -0.0781 -0.0647 -0.0635 -0.0633 -0.0633 
 (0.0697) (0.0695) (0.0695) (0.0695) (0.0695) 
Constant 10.18*** 10.19*** 10.19*** 10.19*** 10.19*** 
 (0.0301) (0.0300) (0.0300) (0.0300) (0.0300) 
      
Observations 6,290 6,266 6,264 6,263 6,263 
R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
Robust Results for the Transportation and Material Moving Industry 
 
Table 36: Robust heterogeneous effects on Single Men in Transportation and Material 
Moving Industry 
 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment -0.0874*** -0.0880*** -0.0875*** -0.0877*** -0.0877*** 
 (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0195) 
yeardummy 0.0765*** 0.0782*** 0.0781*** 0.0779*** 0.0779*** 
 (0.0154) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0155) 
interaction 0.0621** 0.0654** 0.0651** 0.0652** 0.0653** 
 (0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0271) (0.0271) (0.0271) 
Constant 10.07*** 10.07*** 10.07*** 10.07*** 10.07*** 
 (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) 
      
Observations 24,293 24,219 24,202 24,202 24,201 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 37: Robust heterogeneous effects on Single Women in Transportation and Material 
Moving Industry 
 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment -0.0823*** -0.0790*** -0.0820*** -0.0781*** -0.0789*** 
 (0.0195) (0.0197) (0.0198) (0.0198) (0.0198) 
yeardummy 0.0791*** 0.0731*** 0.0753*** 0.0754*** 0.0753*** 
 (0.0155) (0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0157) (0.0157) 
interaction 0.0577** 0.0556** 0.0590** 0.0554** 0.0562** 
 (0.0271) (0.0274) (0.0274) (0.0275) (0.0275) 
Constant 10.07*** 10.08*** 10.08*** 10.08*** 10.08*** 
 (0.0110) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111) 
      
Observations 24,145 23,592 23,516 23,476 23,474 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
Table 38: Robust heterogeneous effects on Divorced Men in Transportation and Material 
Moving Industry 
 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment -0.0872*** -0.0909*** -0.0903*** -0.0904*** -0.0904*** 
 (0.0195) (0.0194) (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0195) 
yeardummy 0.0765*** 0.0791*** 0.0789*** 0.0788*** 0.0788*** 
 (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154) 
interaction 0.0620** 0.0680** 0.0675** 0.0676** 0.0677** 
 (0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0270) 
Constant 10.07*** 10.07*** 10.07*** 10.07*** 10.07*** 
 (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) 
      
Observations 24,293 24,229 24,212 24,212 24,211 
R-squared 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 39: Robust heterogeneous effects on Divorced Women in Transportation and 
Material Moving Industry 
 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment -0.0826*** -0.0752*** -0.0784*** -0.0745*** -0.0754*** 
 (0.0195) (0.0197) (0.0198) (0.0198) (0.0198) 
yeardummy 0.0788*** 0.0772*** 0.0787*** 0.0790*** 0.0789*** 
 (0.0155) (0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0157) (0.0157) 
interaction 0.0575** 0.0484* 0.0514* 0.0478* 0.0487* 
 (0.0271) (0.0274) (0.0274) (0.0275) (0.0275) 
Constant 10.07*** 10.08*** 10.08*** 10.08*** 10.08*** 
 (0.0110) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111) 
      
Observations 24,158 23,636 23,566 23,529 23,527 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 40: Robust heterogeneous effects on Married Men in Transportation and Material 
Moving Industry 
 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment -0.0870*** -0.0899*** -0.0893*** -0.0893*** -0.0893*** 
 (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0195) 
yeardummy 0.0767*** 0.0770*** 0.0768*** 0.0768*** 0.0768*** 
 (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154) 
interaction 0.0616** 0.0669** 0.0664** 0.0665** 0.0665** 
 (0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0270) 
Constant 10.07*** 10.07*** 10.07*** 10.07*** 10.07*** 
 (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) 
      
Observations 24,300 24,247 24,232 24,231 24,231 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 41: Robust heterogeneous effects on Divorced Women in Transportation and 
Material Moving Industry 
 logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage logincwage 
VARIABLES (No child) 
(1) 
    (1 child) 
(2) 
(2 children) 
(3) 
(3 children) 
(4) 
(4 children) 
(5) 
      
treatment -0.0873*** -0.0859*** -0.0855*** -0.0855*** -0.0855*** 
 (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0195) 
yeardummy 0.0780*** 0.0773*** 0.0788*** 0.0785*** 0.0785*** 
 (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0155) 
interaction 0.0624** 0.0610** 0.0611** 0.0612** 0.0612** 
 (0.0270) (0.0271) (0.0271) (0.0271) (0.0271) 
Constant 10.07*** 10.07*** 10.07*** 10.07*** 10.07*** 
 (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) 
      
Observations 24,272 24,131 24,099 24,093 24,093 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robustness Checks – VIFS  
Production Industry  
 
Table 42: VIFS for Single Men 
 Single Men 
(No Child) 
Single Men 
(1 Child) 
Single Men 
(2 Children) 
Single Men 
(3 Children) 
Single Men 
(4 Children) 
VARIABLES            VIF 
 
  VIF   
 
          VIF VIF 
 
VIF 
 
      
interaction 2.91 2.91 2.91 2.91 2.91 
      
treatment 2.41 2.41 2.41 2.41 2.41 
      
yeardummy 1.50 1.49 1.49 1.49 1.49 
      
      
Mean VIF  2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 
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Table 43: VIFS for Single Women 
 Single Women 
(No Child) 
Single Women 
(1 Child) 
Single Women 
(2 Children) 
Single Women 
(3 Children) 
Single Women 
(4 Children) 
VARIABLES   VIF 
 
VIF   
 
  VIF VIF 
 
VIF 
 
      
interaction 2.91 2.91 2.91 2.91 2.91 
      
treatment 2.40 2.40 2.41 2.40 2.40 
      
yeardummy 1.50 1.50 1.49 1.49 1.49 
      
      
Mean VIF  2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 
      
      
 
 
 
 
 
Table 44: VIFS for Divorced Men 
 Divorced Men 
(No Child) 
Divorced Men 
 (1 Child) 
Divorced Men 
 (2 Children) 
Divorced Men 
 (3 Children) 
Divorced Men 
 (4 Children) 
VARIABLES   VIF 
 
  VIF   
 
    VIF VIF 
 
VIF 
 
      
interaction 2.91 2.91 2.91 2.91 2.91 
      
treatment 2.41 2.41 2.41 2.41 2.41 
      
yeardummy 1.50 1.49 1.49 1.49 1.49 
      
      
Mean VIF  2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 
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Table 45: VIFS for Divorced Women 
 Divorced 
Women 
(No Child) 
Divorced 
Women 
 (1 Child) 
Divorced 
Women 
 (2 Children) 
Divorced 
Women 
 (3 Children) 
Divorced 
Women 
 (4 Children) 
VARIABLES    VIF 
 
  VIF   
 
   VIF  VIF 
 
VIF 
 
      
interaction 2.91 2.91 2.91 2.91 2.91 
      
treatment 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 
      
yeardummy 1.50 1.49 1.49 1.49 1.49 
      
      
Mean VIF  2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 
      
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 46: VIFS for Married Men 
 Married Men 
(No Child) 
Married Men 
 (1 Child) 
Married Men 
 (2 Children) 
Married Men 
 (3 Children) 
Married Men 
 (4 Children) 
VARIABLES            VIF 
 
VIF   
 
 VIF VIF 
 
VIF 
 
      
interaction 2.91 2.91 2.91 2.91 2.91 
      
treatment 2.41 2.41 2.41 2.41 2.41 
      
yeardummy 1.50 1.49 1.49 1.49 1.49 
      
      
Mean VIF  2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 
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Table 47: VIFS for Married Women 
 Married 
Women 
(No Child) 
Married Women 
 (1 Child) 
Married Women 
 (2 Children) 
Married Women 
 (3 Children) 
Married Women 
 (4 Children) 
VARIABLES VIF 
 
VIF   
 
 VIF VIF 
 
VIF 
 
interaction      
 2.91 2.91 2.91 2.91 2.91 
treatment      
 2.41 2.40 2.41 2.41 2.41 
yeardummy      
interaction 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 
      
      
Mean VIF  2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 
      
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports and Media Industry 
 
 
Table 48: VIFS for Single Men 
 Single Men 
 (No Child) 
Single Men 
 (1 Child) 
Single Men 
 (2 Children) 
Single Men 
 (3 Children) 
Single Men 
 (4 Children) 
VARIABLES    VIF 
 
  VIF   
 
  VIF VIF 
 
VIF 
 
      
interaction 3.14 3.13 3.14 3.13 3.13 
      
treatment 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 
      
yeardummy 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 
      
      
Mean VIF  2.43 2.43 2.43 2.43 2.43 
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Table 49: VIFS for Single Women 
 Single Women 
 (No Child) 
Single Women 
 (1 Child) 
Single Women 
 (2 Children) 
Single Women 
 (3 Children) 
Single Women 
 (4 Children) 
VARIABLES      VIF 
 
  VIF   
 
   VIF VIF 
 
VIF 
 
      
interaction 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 
      
treatment 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 
      
yeardummy 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 
      
      
Mean VIF  2.43 2.43 2.43 2.43 2.43 
      
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 50: VIFS for Divorced Men 
 Divorced Men 
 (No Child) 
Divorced Men 
 (1 Child) 
Divorced Men 
 (2 Children) 
Divorced Men 
 (3 Children) 
Divorced Men 
 (4 Children) 
VARIABLES   VIF 
 
  VIF   
 
       VIF VIF 
 
VIF 
 
      
interaction 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 
      
treatment 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 
      
yeardummy 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 
      
      
Mean VIF  2.43 2.43 2.43 2.43 2.43 
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Table 51: VIFS for Divorced Women 
 Divorced 
Women 
 (No Child) 
Divorced 
Women 
 (1 Child) 
Divorced 
Women 
 (2 Children) 
Divorced 
Women 
 (3 Children) 
Divorced 
Women 
 (4 Children) 
VARIABLES   VIF 
 
  VIF   
 
    VIF VIF 
 
VIF 
 
      
interaction 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 
      
treatment 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 
      
yeardummy 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 
      
      
Mean VIF  2.43 2.43 2.43 2.43 2.43 
      
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 52: VIFS for Married Men 
 Married Men 
 (No Child) 
Married Men 
 (1 Child) 
Married Men 
 (2 Children) 
Married Men 
 (3 Children) 
Married Men 
 (4 Children) 
VARIABLES   VIF 
 
  VIF   
 
          VIF VIF 
 
VIF 
 
      
interaction 3.14 3.14 3.13 3.13 3.13 
      
treatment 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 
      
yeardummy 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 
      
      
Mean VIF  2.43 2.43 2.43 2.43 2.43 
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Table 53: VIFS for Married Women 
 Married 
Women 
 (No Child) 
Married Women 
 (1 Child) 
Married Women 
 (2 Children) 
Married Women 
 (3 Children) 
Married Women 
 (4 Children) 
VARIABLES            VIF 
 
  VIF   
 
          VIF VIF 
 
VIF 
 
      
interaction 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 
      
treatment 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 
      
yeardummy 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 
      
      
Mean VIF  2.43 2.43 2.43 2.43 2.43 
      
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transportation and Material Moving Industry 
 
Table 54: VIFS for Single Men 
 Single Men 
 (No Child) 
Single Men 
 (1 Child) 
Single Men 
 (2 Children) 
Single Men 
 (3 Children) 
Single Men 
 (4 Children) 
VARIABLES    VIF 
 
  VIF   
 
  VIF VIF 
 
VIF 
 
      
interaction 3.06 3.05 3.05 3.05 3.05 
      
treatment 2.44 2.44 2.44 2.44 2.44 
      
yeardummy 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 
      
      
Mean VIF  2.36 2.36 2.36 2.36 2.36 
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Table 55: VIFS for Single Women 
 Single Women 
 (No Child) 
Single Women 
 (1 Child) 
Single Women 
 (2 Children) 
Single Women 
 (3 Children) 
Single Women 
 (4 Children) 
VARIABLES      VIF 
 
  VIF   
 
   VIF VIF 
 
VIF 
 
      
interaction 3.06 3.05 3.05 3.05 3.05 
      
treatment 2.44 2.44 2.44 2.44 2.44 
      
yeardummy 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 
      
      
Mean VIF  2.36 2.36 2.36 2.36 2.36 
      
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 56: VIFS for Divorced Men 
 Divorced Men 
 (No Child) 
Divorced Men 
 (1 Child) 
Divorced Men 
 (2 Children) 
Divorced Men 
 (3 Children) 
Divorced Men 
 (4 Children) 
VARIABLES   VIF 
 
  VIF   
 
       VIF VIF 
 
VIF 
 
      
interaction 3.06 3.06 3.05 3.06 3.05 
      
treatment 2.44 2.44 2.44 2.44 2.44 
      
yeardummy 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 
      
      
Mean VIF  2.36 2.36 2.36 2.36 2.36 
      
      
 
 57 
 
 
 
Table 57: VIFS for Divorced Women 
 Divorced 
Women 
 (No Child) 
Divorced 
Women 
 (1 Child) 
Divorced 
Women 
 (2 Children) 
Divorced 
Women 
 (3 Children) 
Divorced 
Women 
 (4 Children) 
VARIABLES   VIF 
 
  VIF   
 
    VIF VIF 
 
VIF 
 
      
interaction 3.06 3.06 3.05 3.05 3.05 
      
treatment 2.44 2.44 2.44 2.44 2.44 
      
yeardummy 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 
      
      
Mean VIF  2.36 2.36 2.36 2.36 2.36 
      
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 58: VIFS for Married Men 
 Married Men 
 (No Child) 
Married Men 
 (1 Child) 
Married Men 
 (2 Children) 
Married Men 
 (3 Children) 
Married Men 
 (4 Children) 
VARIABLES   VIF 
 
  VIF   
 
          VIF VIF 
 
VIF 
 
      
interaction 3.06 3.05 3.05 3.05 3.05 
      
treatment 2.44 2.44 2.44 2.44 2.44 
      
yeardummy 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 
      
      
Mean VIF  2.36 2.36 2.36 2.36 2.36 
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Table 59: VIFS for Married Women 
 Married 
Women 
 (No Child) 
Married Women 
 (1 Child) 
Married Women 
 (2 Children) 
Married Women 
 (3 Children) 
Married Women 
 (4 Children) 
VARIABLES            VIF 
 
  VIF   
 
          VIF VIF 
 
VIF 
 
      
interaction 3.06 3.05 3.05 3.05 3.05 
      
treatment 2.44 2.43 2.43 2.43 2.43 
      
yeardummy 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 
      
      
Mean VIF  2.36 2.36 2.36 2.36 2.36 
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